As will be the ones in the USA. If they want them to be acceptable internationally.
Bzzzt. They are nominally valid for the maximum of 10 years.
Acceptability would depend on the person accepting the pbuttport as valid. Missing pages or additional ones are traditionally regarded as suspicious. That's why every page is clearly numbered and the binding sufficiently robust so that missing pages or a re-bound pbuttport are immediately suspicous.
OT RFID chips in pbuttports next year 3018So who's been tampering with my computer? All chips fail; eventually. Gevernment? Nobody's worried about a government doing something "useful" with the data. Not unless the dyes...
Plastics tear far more easily than paper-cloth. Attaching a plastic document to a plastic pbuttport? Possible with adhesives but unless the adhesive causes chemical welding of the plastics, the attached page can be removed so that it's not evident during cursory inspection. Plastics that are chemically weldable also have a tough time with other solvents; and are probably not dry-cleanable.
OT RFID chips in pbuttports next year 3022Bernd Felsche When an officer pulls you over for speeding, he will run your license through his RFID reader. If it does not read, there is something wrong with it. Similarly you...
Repeating what has already been discounted doesn't re-validate your buttertion.
Produce a definitive reference of join the trolls under the bridge.
Most border crossing points aren't equipped with electron microscopes to be able to tell the difference. And it also doesn't matter how the damage occurred as even the microscope won't be able to detrmine the "why".
Not relevant. Unless the US GPO changes its mind, the pbuttports will be paper.
Not relevant. You're imagining a process that isn't going to happen.
Not much.
You're buttuming that the RFID is more important than the document which it's trying to authenticate.
You're buttuming that verey unreadable RFID will invoke an investigative process that requires an enormous infrastructure in terms of deployed technology and real expertise. Such real expertise must be legally sustainable for there to be legitimate suspicion of willful tampering.
No such things exist; nor has anybody invented a dye to indicate "intent". If 99% of failed RFID are down to "accidental" damage and inherent "wear", then how can you easily distinguish that from the remaining 1%.
It has to be easy (and cheap) because if it isn't, then it won't be done rigourously.
"Tampering" indicates an intent. Even a device that's been "engineered" to indicate "tampering" can fail. If it misleads and causes wrongful discrimination or prosecution, then the "engineered" device will no longer be trusted.
Although the USA has given itself a year more than everybody else to comply with the requirements it's promoted, such "engineered" devices are still ficticious and undefined.
The authenticity of the document can be ascertained by other means.
Perhaps you actually don't understand: The failure of RFID should not impose closer scrutiny. All pbuttports should receive equal scrutiny.
As should a functioning one!
The important thing to consider is that the RFID doesn't in reality make the pbuttport more secure.
US GPO worked with ICAO to produce those recommendations. That says a lot for how much you value your government's agencies.
I can only hope that they will ignore RFID "features" and continue or adopt reasonable scrutiny of the document along with the behaviour of the holder.
What does that get you? -- "Bernd Felsche - Innovative Reckoning, Perth, Western Australia ASCII ribbon campaign Economist E*con"o*mist-, n. X against HTML mail One with a ready explanation as to why and postings his last prediction was so wrong
