The signal strength of microwave oven vs door opener is irrelevant. You suggested that a dye be used to detect microwaves. Such dyes will, over time, discolour, and such processes will be accelerated by prolonged-repeated exposure to radiation - of all wavelengths.
It's not necessary for the device to return a signal for it to be damaged.
The nominal method of operation is inductive coupling. That doesn't preclude using that antenna to inject a large energy pulse that destroys at least the front-end.
Why? Even with a vastly-inefficient "antenna", the power presented at the RFID chip will still be around a few watts. ICAO cautions against the heat from laminating machines damaging the devices; as well as embossing, etc during pbuttport manufcature and "branding".
Perhaps you should re-read the ICAO recommendations; especially the caveats and cautions.
Why should you "track" foreigners? If you don't trust them, don't give them a visa.
Except when they have it in the queue at pbuttport controls.
You really should re-read the BAC specified-optional-proposed in ICAO Doc 9303 and PKI tech report. It requires that the reader obtain an out-of-band code that's hashed to obtain an access code. The RFID can still be tracked without the code whenever the pbuttport is "opened" and eavesdropping of full information (including the BAC) is still possible at "authorised" reader locations.
The strength of the key used for BAC is fairly weak (56 bits max; typically 52 bits).
As BAC is optional, the document is still required to respond to "pbuttive authentication". That provides a system vulnerability which could allow some forged documents to pbutt through controls that aren't especially vigilant about which types of documents ought to be "requiring" BAC.
The most-secure "active authentication", which provides some protection against chip subsbreastution, is also "optional".
Pbuttive eavesdropping takes very little effort. It's almost undetectable.
In my reality, I've actually read several of the ICAO documents and comments papers-submissions by RSA, etc.
-- "Bernd Felsche - Innovative Reckoning, Perth, Western Australia ASCII ribbon campaign Economist E*con"o*mist-, n. X against HTML mail One with a ready explanation as to why and postings his last prediction was so wrong
